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manufacturingsectorareidentifiedin thisstudy.It is arguedthatonly







theirvariationovertimereflecttheinfluenceof a numberof forceson wage
determination.Hencea satisfactoryanswerto anyquestionon wagepolicy,
e.g.theallocationof labouramongdifferentindustries,requiresan identifica.
tionof theseforces.
Wagestructure,the analysisof whichcan be carriedout frommany
angles,is a vastfield. Thepresentpaper confinesthe analysisonly to a
studyof inter-industrywagedifferentialsto determinetherelativeimpact of
forceslike tradeunions,monopolyin theproductmarket,foreigntradeand
qualityof theworkerson thewagestructure.




showsthatonlyapartof thewagedifferentialscanbeaccountedfor by theskill
factor. Theabilityof thefirmsto paymorethanthegoingwage,whichis a
functionof theproductmarketstructure,andthedegreeof unionizationare-
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consideredto betheotherimportantvariablesexplainingwage inequalities
acrossdifferentindustriesfor a givenskill class.
Theeffectof thestructureof theproductmarketon wagestructurehas
beenvariouslyexplainedin the literature. Largefirms tendto pay wage
premiumsto isolatewagesfromthepressureof marketforcesfor theplanning
periodandto ensureadequatesupplyof labour. Firmsin concentratedindus-
triesmaygranthigherwagesalsobecauseof an inelasticdemandfor their
productsand,hence,for labour. Higherprofitabilitydueto barriersonentry
of newfirmsmayresultin higherwageseitherfromunionpressuresor manage-
mentbenevolence.Furthermore,the effectivenessof tradeunions is also
relatedtoandmodifiedbytheproductmarketstructure.A monopolyis notonly
easyto organizebutalsoITlOnopolistsacquiescein uniondemandson account
of a permissiveproductmarketenvironment.
Apparentlythereseemsto bea consensusamongthemajorityof resear-
cherson thesubjecthatthesenon-competitiveelements,e.g.productmarket




imperfectionsin the productmarketor thefactormarketandrelativewage
changeswill implythatstaticnon-competitiveadvantagewasnotfullyexploited
in therecentpast. In theshortrun, thesenon-competitiveelementswiII not
change,hencerelativewagechangesareexplainedby an excessdemandfor
labour.
However,such an analyticalframeworkcannotfully explaininter-
industrialwagedifferentialsin a countrylike Pakistanpartlybecauseof the
ruralmanpowereservoir,whichweakensconsiderablytheexcessdemandfor
labourhypothesis.Besides,the concentrationin the productmarketmay
bedifficultto specifyempiricallyin thepresenceof excessivelyhightariffpro-
tectionandimportlicensing.Neglectof foreigntradeis anotherlimitationof
theabove-mentionedframeworkbecauseindustriesinvolvedin export trade




objectiveof thestudyis to determinetherelativeeffectsof variousfactorslike
workers'characteristics(skill),workers'organizationsandindustrialcharacter-
isticson wages. We shallalsocarryout a pooledcross-sectionandtime-
seriesanalysisof averageindustrialwageinvolvingfifteenindustrialcategories
atthetwo-digitlevelclassificationfor nineyears. Non-availabilityof relevant
time-seriesdataon variableslike tradeunions,skill,andproductmarketcon-
centrationperforcereducedthislatteranalysisto theinvestigationof anassocia-







a checkon therelevanceof theexcessdemandfor labourhypothesiswhichis
discussedat lengthin thispaper.
Theanalysisin thepaperhasbeenorganizedin threesections. In the
first section, we discussthe possibledeterminantsof inter-industrywage
differentials,whiletheempiricalresultsarediscussedin thesecondsection.Fin-
ally,policyimplications,conclusionsandlimitationsof thestudyarepresented.
DETERMINANTS OF INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
An earlierstudyfocusedon theanalysisofearningsofproductionworkers
in themanufacturingindustriesfor theyears1964-1965and1969-1970[3].It was
foundthatthequalityofworkers(skilllevel),capitalintensity,degreeof unioni-
zationandtheshareofforeignfirmsin anindustrialcategorymadeasignificant
impactonthelevelof wagesof productionworkers. The firsttwo variables,
theskillindexandcapitalintensity,turnedouttobesignificantvariablesexplain-
ingthelevelof wagesforboththeyears,whilethetradeunionvariablewassig-
nificantonlyfor theyear1964-1965andtheshareof foreignfirmsin 1969-1970.
In thispaperweextendtheearlierstudyto theyearof 1970-197I. In addition,
thepresentstudyimproveson theearlieroneby includingfour newvariables
representingproductmarketconcentration,foreigntrade,rateof profit and
tariff protection. However,beforepresentingthe resultsof thisexercise,
it wouldbeusefulto discussthepossibledeterminantsof inter-industrywage
differentials.
Skill Index
Thequalityof workers(skiIllevel)shouldnormallyhavea positive ffect
on theirearnings.Informationon ski1llevelor qualityof workforceis not
available.In thispaperwehaveusedaskillindexto simulatethequalityfactor,
theindexbeingdefinedas thefractionof productionworkerswhichis classed
asskilled. Thisprocedureisnotentirelysatisfactory'becauseweusetheIndian




implicitin all productionfunctions. Thebook valueof fixedassetsdividedby
employmenthasbeenusedinthestudytodenotecapitalintensityofanindustry.
However,associationbetweencapitalintensityand industrialwageis not so
easyto interpret. It maybea reflectionof monopolypowerin theproduct
market,thedegreeof foreignfirms'participationandthe profitabilityof an
industry. Also a systematicrelationshipbetweencapital intensityandthe
skill indexcannotberuledout.
ForeignOwnership
Foreignfirms, dueto variousreasons,oftenpursuea highwagepolicy,
outof linewith the labourmarketconditionsof a developingcountry. This
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policycanhoweverbeexplainedin termsof the eagernessof theforeignfirms
to avoidconfrontationwiththegovernmentand labour unions of the host
country. In thispapertheproportionof foreigncontrolledfirmsin anindustry
hasbeenusedasaproxy for theforeignownership.For thepurposesof this
studya firmis deemedtobeforeigncontrolledif foreignersown thirtypercent
or moreof theequitycapital. It must be mentionedthatapropertestof the
presumedrelationshipbetweenwagelevelandforeignownershiprequiresinter-




trialprofits. Similarly,certainfringe benefitspaid to the workers,suchas
bonus,arecustomarilytiedto theprofitsof thefirms. Thusapositiveassocia-
tionbetweenindustrialprofit rateandwagelevelis expecteda priori. The
ratioof non-wagevalueaddedto thebookvalueof fixedassetsasreportedin
theCensusof ManufacturingIndustriesfor theyear1970-1971,hasbeenusedas






powerof theworkers. Theireffectonwagesof theworkersmaybeenhanced
in thepresenceof product marketconcentrationandhighprofitability. Data
onthetradeunionmembershipby industrialcategoryare availableonly for
1964-1965whichis usedin this paper.The effectof unionismwith varying
degreesof productmarketmonopoly,rateof profit and capitalintensityhas
beenassessedbyincorporatinginteractivevariables.
Concentration
. Productmarketconcentrationhas a bearingon inter-industrialwage
differential.Thereasonswhy largefirmspay wageshigherthancompetitive
firmshavealreadybeendiscussed.The conventionalproxyof productma,rket
concentration,i.e.the four firmconcentrationratio isusedin thispaper. In
thecaseof Pakistanthisratiomay not be a veryreliableindicatorof firm's
marketbehaviour.t
lAn opencollusionamongfirmsis hardlyforbidden. Firms in lessconcentratedindus-
triescan coordinatefor prke setting. Pricestabilityconsiderationsoftenledthegovernment
to encouragethesepractices. The creationof newcapacityor entryof thefirm is subjectto
government'licensing,which may be unrelatedto the profits of theexisting firms. Price
competitionthrough an increasedvolumeof productionis effectivelyblockedbecauseinter-
mediateinputs, spareparts and capital equipmentsare subjectto severeimport licensing.
Therefore,evenin anotherwisecompetitiveindustryonemayexpectoutputlevelscorrespon-











Importsatdifferentratesof importduty areallowedto supplementthe
domesticproduction.Theprotectionextendedto domesticproducerpresumably
leadsto higherprofits,whichmay be sharedbyworkers. The rateof tariff
protectionfor the year 1970-1971is usedtodetermineitseffecton industrial
wages. To theextent,however,importsareallowedunderlicencetheconnec-
tionbetweentariffprotectionandproductmarketpowerof a domesticproducer
is weakened.Hadtherebeenno licensingof importsthe importdutyand
transportcostwouldhaveconstituteda limittowhichdomesticproducercould







tereddomesticmarket. Thevalueof exportsasa fractionof theoutputof an
industrialcategoryis usedto determineitseffecton industrialwages.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empiricalestimationof the relationshipbetweenaverageannual
earningsof productionworkersfor theyear1970-1971andtheaforementioned
factorsis discussedin sub-section(a). In thesub-section(b)a similarexercise
isconductedtoexplaintheproportionatechangesin theaverageannualearnings
of theproductionworkersbetweenthe year1969-1970and 1970-1971.This is
followedbysub-section(c)wherewediscusstheresultof pooledcrosssection
timeseriesfor theperiod1959-1960to 1970-1971.
(a) A CrossSectionStudyof WageDifferentialsfor 1970-197J
Theaverageannualearnings(wages)of productionworkersfor theyear
1970-1971for 17manufacturingindustries(at thetwo digit levelclassification)
are regressedon various independentvariables.The resultsof this exercise
havebeenpresentedinTable1. As canbeseenonlyhalfor lessthanhalfof the
varianceinrelativewagescanbeexplainedinthisway. All thethreeindependent
variables(in equation1)skill index,foreignparticipation,and exportorienta.
tion- turn out to be significant.An additionof thetrade union variable
(in equation2) doesnotaddto theexplainedvariance.However,it injectsa
multicollinearitywhichrenderstheexportorientationvariableinsignificantand





collinearityleadto inconsistentsignificancel velsof manyvariablesin different
equations.Exceptingfor theskill indexandforeignparticipation,whichre-
tainedthe statisticalsignificancein mostof the equations,otherregressors.
failedto quaJifythe conventionalsignificancelevel. None of thevariables~
however,has an unexpectedsign.
Thefactthat,labour-forcequalityor theskiJIindex,is significant,it refle-
ctstheimportanceof themarketforcesinwagedetermination.As farasforeign
participation,theothersignificantvariablein theequationsystem,isconcerned,
it is hardto classifyit asa marketor a non-marketvariable.It is a distortion
aswellasinconsistentwiththenotionof profit maximization2if higherwage
levelof the foreignfirmsis eitherdueto theirwisepostureto avoidfriction
withthe workerand host governmentand/or representsadoptionof their
homecountrywagerates.
The variable representingproductmarketpower-the concentration




however,fails to supportthe monopolywage hypothesis,becausethe co-
efficientof concentrationratiois of lowersizethanthatof the multiplicative
variablereprescntingtheinter-activeeffectof boththetradeunionandcon-
centration.This is not unexpectedgiventhatfactthatconcentrationratiois a
poorproxyof the.marketbehaviourof thefirm.3
The tradeunionvariabledoesnotqualify theconventionalsignificance
level in thepresenceof otherregressorslikeskiUindex,foreignparticipation,
and exportorientation.Sincethe industrieswhichare skiU-intensiveand
dominatedby foreignfirms tendto behighlyunionized,thestatisticalinsigni-
ficanceof tradeunions-a productof multicollinearity-hardlyconstitutesa
proofthatunionshavenoeffecton wages. Simplecorrelationbetweenunioni-
zationand wagesis,however,significant.Themarginaleffectof unionpower
giventheconcentrationor capitalintensityorprofitabilityof industriesis posi-
tivethoughdecJineswhentheotherrelatedvariableincreases.A perusalof
theseequationsuggeststhatthetradeunionsexertan upwardpressureon
'The conjecturethat foreignfirms,by payinghigherthannormal wages,getsuperior




relation considerations,it is possiblethat foreignfirms pay higher wagesonaccountof the
regulationsgoverningprofitrepatriation. Partof theprofits(50%or so)islegally,requiredto
bereinvestedin thecountrywhichappearsa disincentivefor profitmaximizationIf theavail-
ablevenuesfor additionalinvestmentareeitherlesspromisingor leadto an involvementwith
a cumbersomelicensingsystemof thecountry. In theseconditionsforeignfirI?Jsmayprefer
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wages. Theireffectivenessi relativelyfeltmoreincaseof lesscapitalintensive,
lessprofitable,and less concentratedindustries.In other\vordsit is either
unionismor itsthreatwhichleadsto higherwagesin capitalintensiveandcon-
centratedindustries.
It isharderto isolatetheindependenteffectof tradeunionsonwagesof
theproductionworkersin theabsence-of informationon earningsand char-
acteristicsof individuals.SkiJIindexattwo-digitlevelis an imperfectproxyof
individuals,qualification,ageandexperience.It is interestingtonote,however,
that skiJl indexturns insignificantin thepresenceof tradeunions,capital
intensityandinteractiontermsof thelattertwo variables.This givesan im-
pressionthatunionrelatedwagegainsmaynotbecompensatedfullybyadjust-
mentin theskill levelof thework force.
1\
ExportOrientation
Exceptingfor thefirstequation,exportvariableis notsignificantin any
of the equations.A consistentnegativeassociationbetweenwageleveland
exportsas a percentageof output,however,suggeststhatexportsarelargely
drawnfrom low-wageindustries.Furthermorethe relativeinsignificanceof
this relationmayhavebeendueto the aggregationbias-the two-digitlevel






tries.4An ordinalrankingonthebasisof averagewagesof productionworker
for theyear1969-1970showsthat the bottomfive industrialcategoriesfall




participationof industriesis presentedin Table2. It canbeseenthatthemean
level of the productionworkers'wagesare28percenthigherin theimport
competingthan in the exportindustriesand 15 percenthigherthanin the


























































































differentialin thewagelevel. The skill indexfails to exhibit a systematic
positive associationwith import-competingindustries. Capital intensity,
however,appearsa discriminatoryvariable. High capital intensityof im-
port-competingindustriesbespeaksof theimportanceof thepatternof in-
dustrialization.Importsubstitutionencouragedby provision of capitalat
an over-valuedexchangerateled to capital-laboursubstitutionin import-
competingindustries.High profits due to high capital-labourratio and
protectedmarketsresultedin higherwagesunder tradeunionpressuresor
wagelegislation.
(b) Changesin theWagesof ProductionWorkers:1969-1970to 1970-1971
Proportionatechangesin thewagesof theproductionworkersbetween
the year 1969-1970and 1970-1971areanalyzedin thissection.Sincethereis
no informationonchangesin theskill index,wehadto dropthisvariablefrom
thesetof explanatoryvariables.Twovariables--changein thecapitalintensity
andemploymenthavebeenaddedtotheindependentvariablesdiscussedearlier.
It canbeseenfromTable3thattwo-thirdsof thevariancein thechangesin the




Changesin capitalintensityandin employment,in fact,reflecthesame
phenomenon-capital-laboursubstitution.The negativeassociationbetween
employmentchangesandchangesin capitalintensity,however,injectsmulti-
collinearitywith the resultthat both of themare renderedinsignificantas
jointlyindependentvariables(inequation3). In theabsenceof eitherone,the
othervariablequalifiesundertheconventionalsignificancel vel.
The positiveeffectof profitrateon wagechangesis not so ditlicultto
explain,giventheproportionalitybetweenprofitandcertainfringebenefitslike





yearunderanalysis(1970-1971)is associatedwithandprecededby an unprece-



































































































































































































































































trial wage(levelandchanges)andshareof wagesin totalcostof production,
employment(levelandchanges)andaverageproductivity(leveland changes).
The employmentcost(wageshare)as a fractionof totalcostpresumablyin-
fluencesthe managerialwagedecisions.The managementmay resistwage
raiseswhenwagesaccountfor a largefractionof totalproductioncost. The
associationbetweenemploymentandwageswill helpin assessingtheallocative
role of wagesin the input combinationof producers.Furthermoreit may
provideacheckontheexcessdemandhypothesis.
The resultsof a pooledcross-sectionand time-seriesregression(using
Error-componentModel)hasbeenpresentedin Table4. Thedataon fifteen
industrialcategoriesattwo-digitclassificationarepooledfor theyears1959-1960
to 1970-1971.Censusdataare,however,notavailablefor theyears1960-1961,























t:,.W = Proportionatechangein wagesi.e.
(t-valuesarereportedin theparentheses).
Wt-I
As can be seenfrom theequationsreportedin Table4, theexplained
varianceis substantiallyhigherin caseof the proportionatechangesthan in
the absolutelevel. One reasonfor this phenomenonmay be due to the
reportingerrorswhichgetsmallerwhendataaretransformedintoproportionate
changes.Theestimatedequationshowthatvalueaddedperemployeebears
a significantlypositiveassociationwith wages. This relationshipis, however,
difficultto interpret,becausepieceratesystemof wagepayment.isnot in com-
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monuse,althoughcertainfringebenefitsdo dependon theprofitabilityof the
firm. Sincesomeof therelevantvariablesliketheskill mix,capitalintensity,
andprofitratesarenot incorporated6in theestimation,whichareexpectedto
behighlycorrelatedwithvalueadded. Thepositiveassociationbetweenvalue
addedand thewagesmayin fact reflectthe impactof thesevariables.Be-
sidestheproblemof ascertainingwhatis beingsimulatedthroughvalueadded,
thedirectionof thecausationin the empiricalassociationbetweenwageand
productivityis not verycleartoo.
The shareof labourcost(SW) in theoutputmayreflecthecombined
effectsof entrepreneur'swillingnessandabilityto pay. Sincetotalproduction
costs(valueof output)alsoincludeindirecttaxes,to an unknownextent,this
variablemayreflectthechangingratesof indirecttaxes. Our resultsfail to
confirmtheexpectationthatemployersarelessresistantto wageincreaseswhere
employmentcostsasa fractionof thetotalproductioncostsis small,because
therelationshipbetweentheshareof wagesin outputandchangesin wagerate
is positive. An OECD study[II] foundtheshareof wagesin outputto be
inverselyrelatedtochangesin thelevelof wagesin four out of five Western
countries.However,thisrelationshipwasconsideredweakas it was domi.
natedbytheassociationbetweenthe variousmarketvariablesand changes
in theearningsin particularperiods.
As a Marshalliandeterminantof the elasticityof deriveddemandfor
labour,theimportanceandexpectedsignof variablerepresentingtheshareof
wagesin total costdependson the elasticityof substitutionbetweencapital
andlabourin productionandconsumption,if theformerishigherthanthelatter.
thewagesharemayhavea negligibleinfluenceandevenacquirea perversesign.
In equation1,whereit is regressedon levelof wagesit hastheexpectedsignbut




exercise,reflectsthe influenceof factor'spriceson inputcombinationin the
productionprocess.Our findings,howeverfail to confirmtheexcessdemand
hypothesiswhichimpliesa positiverelationshipbetweenwagesand employ-
ment. Theexplanationof thisphenomenonliesin theruralmanpowereser-
voirandnatureof thelabourmarketof adevelopingcountrylikePakistan.
First of all excessdemand,definedas unfilledvacanciesminusunem-
ployedmaynot exist,becausethejob availabilityin themanufacturingsector
inducesa rural to urbanmigrationwhichoftensurpassestheirrequirement.
Admittedlythereis alwaysshortageof certainskills. This excessdemand








It is interestingto note thatevidenceondevelopedcountriesis notvery
cleartoo and excessdemandhypothesisis not fully confirmed.An OECD
studygroupsusingdatafor fiveWesterndevelopedcountries(includingthe




tivefactorpricevariablesare includedas explanatoryvariablesof thewage
changesandremarkedthat"overtheperiodof 1961-1963changingfactorprices,
the long run force underlyingwagedeterminationswampedthe short run
effect".
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Thefindingsof our papersuggestthattheskillof theworkersis notthe
onlydeterminantof thewagelevelof theproductionworkers. Thetradeunions




participationof anindustryhasa bearinguponthewagesof productionworker.
Responsivenessof wageto the abovementionedvariousvariablescan best
beestimatedby elasticitycoefficientsgivenbelow:
Given thefragiledatabase,to be discussedlater, the elasticityco-
efficientsareto be interpretedwithcaution. Thesecoefficientscanhardlybe
usedfor anypredictivepurpose. It maybeseenfromTable5,however,that
wageseemto bequitesensitiveto thecapitalintensity,tradeunionsandpro-
fitabilityof theindustry. Theskillindexfailedtoemergeasthemostdominant













nineteeni dustrialcategoriesatthetwo-digitlevelfor 1969-1970.An industrypayingthe
highestwagestoadministrativeemployeesmaybepayingaver;igeorbelowaveragewagesto





































analysishasbeenconductedat fairly aggregativel vel,and the influenceof
somevariablesmay havebeenunder-estimatedas a Pronouncedeffectat
firmlevelgetsdilutedat two-digitlevelclassification.
Giventhe levelof aggregationof our analysisand thefact thatthe
unionismandcollectivebargainingexistonlyattheplantlevelanimplicationof
our resultis thattheunionizedlargecapitalintensivefirmspaywageshigher
thanthe less-capitalintensivesmallfirms. The proportionalitybetweenpro-
fitabilityandpaymentof fringebenefits(suchas bonus)to workerstendsto
sharpenthisdemarcation.Inter-firmdisparitiesin wagesfor thesameskilled
class,stemmingfrom unionmilitancy,capitalintensityandprofitabilityof a
firm shouldbe a causefor concern. Not onlydoesit tantamountto price
discriminationbutas a sourceof frictionwithintheworkingclassandpressure
on smallscaleproducer. We do not advocatecurbingunionactivities.In
fact,the encouragementof the unionizationand colJectivebargainingat the




is reflectiveof thefact thatworkersemployedin exportindustries,arepaid











their disposal. This distortedwagestructureappearsa by-productof the
importsubstitutiondrivealongwiththeassociatedmeasuresof tariffprotection
and overvaluedexchangerate. Whetherthispolarisationof wagealongthe
linesof foreigntradeparticipationof an industryadverselyaffectsthenormal
patternof comparativeadvantageof acountryis difficulto ascertain.Sincethis
resultpertainsto onlya singleyear1970-1971,it requiresfurtherinvestigation.
If the inversecorrelationbetweenwageand exportsis verifiedby the latter
studiesthena wagesubsidyto exportsindustries,financedby payroll taxesin
theprotectedindustries,seemsworthyof consideration.
An inverseassociationbetweenemploymentand wagesimpliesthat
generationof job opportunitiesin the manufacturingsectoris faciiitatedby
restrainingthe wageraises. Unemploymenthasbeena pressingproblemin
the late1960'sandearly 1970's.Thanksto theexodusof manpowerto the
Middle East,thepressurehasbeenrelievedandthe unemploymentproblem
seemsto havebeenrelegatedto secondaryimportance.With theendin con-
structionboomin MiddleEasterncountriesin nearfuturetheemigrantswill
stagea comeback.The unemploymentproblemwill re-emergewith added
dimensionsandgravity.
How topreparetheeconomyfor theimpendingtransitionfromanexpor-
terto anemployerof its ownmanpowernecessitatesthestudyof thebroader
issueslikechoiceof industrialmix,choiceof technologyandpricingof capital
besidesthewagepolicy. It wouldbe naive to suggesthat let the market
forcesof demandand supplydeterminethewagelevel which clearsthe
labourmarket. Not onlyis sucha wagestructuredifficultoachievebutincon-
sistentwithnormsofequityandaspirationsofworkingclass. An incomepolicy











the firmscannotbe capturedby the conventionalproxy-four firms con-
centrationratio-in thepresenceof restrictivelicensingand absenceof anti-
collusionlaws. Similarly,no significantrelationshipbetweentariffprotection
andwagelevelis yieldedby our analysis.
Pooledtimeseriesandcrosssectionstatisticalanalysisof theindustrial
wages(for all employees)demonstratestheimportanceof factorpricefor input
52 MohammadIrfall ' Inter-Industry Wage Structure 53
combinationin the manufacturingsector. A significantinverseassociation
betweenwage(levelandchanges)and employment(leveland changes)is a
majorresultof ouranalysis. l-
7. Lewis,H. G. UnionismandRelativeWagesin the U.S.: An Empirical
Enquiry. Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress.1963.
8. Organizationfor European Cooperationand Development.Wages
andLabour Mobility. Paris.1965.
9. Sherwani,KhaIid. "Some New Evidence on Concentrationand
Profitability in Pakistan'sLarge Scale ManufacturingIndustries."
ThePakistanDevelopmentReview. Vol. XV, No.3. Autumn1976.
10.Taira, Koji. "Wage Differentialsin DevelopingCountries." Inter.
nationalLabourReview. April 1968.
11.Watcher,MichaelL. "Cyclical Variationsin the Inter-industryWage
Structure." The AmericanEconomicReview. March 1970.
12.White, Lawrence. IndustrialConcentrationand EconomicPower in
Pakistan. Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress. 1974
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Thestudysuffersfroma fewdrawbacks,whichimpairthevalidityof our
conclusionsandrelevanceof our policyimplications.The treatmentof trade
unionsandemploymentasexogenousi notverysatisfactory.Inter-dependence
betweentradeuniongrowthandwagegainsis increasinglybeingrecognized.
Similarlyemploymentand wagesare jointly determined.To an unknown
extent,therefore,our estimationmaybe runninginto simultaneityproblem.
Our failureto improvemainlystemsfromthepaucityof data.
Sinceour analysishasbeenconductedat two digit classificationlevel
thuswe havetriedto explaintherelationshipamongaverages,which mask
tremendousvariation.Averagewagesasadatatobeanalysedhasanadditional
problembecauseno adjustmentfor overtimeworkhasbeenmadedue to non
availabilityof thedata. A meaningfulanalysisof the inter-industrialwage
differentialsrequiresinformationon workers'characteristicslike education,
skill, age,experience,andon thejob trainingso astodisentangletheeffectof
workerrelatedcharacteristicsfromotherson thewagelevel. Suchanunder-
takingis precludedby lackof data,however.
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